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Introduction . Motivation
In this paper, we discuss, following [ , ] , a new general attack, called the dimension or linear decomposition attack, on various group-based cryptosystems. We do cryptanalysis of ten principle protocols (see Section ) while quite a few of others can be dealt similarly. The attack works when the platform groups (or semigroups, or algebras, or some other related objects) have e cient matrix representations (though we do not require here that the group embeds into the linear space homomorphically). Furthermore, the schemes themselves should be based on algorithmic problems of a particular type: the conjugacy search problem, the decomposition search problem, the factorization problem, automorphic actions -those inducing linear transformations on the underlying linear space. We show that, in this case, contrary to the common opinion (and some explicitly stated security assumptions), one does not need to solve the underlying algorithmic problems to break the schemes, i.e., there is another algorithm that recovers the private keys without solving the principal algorithmic problem on which the security assumptions are based. This changes completely our understanding of security of these schemes. Though the schemes are quite di erent the attack is uniform, it is based on the same idea from linear algebra related to linear decompositions and dimensions of the vector spaces at hands, hence the name. Our results are rather theoretical, we show that the attack breaks the keys in polynomial time in the size of the public data, but we do not try to get sharp estimates on the degrees of the polynomials, neither we do any implementations of the algorithms. The e cacy of the attack depends also on the platform groups, so sharp estimates would require a speci c analysis in each particular case, which is out of the scope of the paper. We also discuss how to improve the schemes in order to fail the dimension attack. The easiest way would be to choose the platform groups which do not have e cient matrix representations. However, this would leave many interesting groups, in particular all nite groups, out of reach. On the other hand, the group might be linear, but the dimensions of its linear representations could be so large that the dimension attacks become ine cient. Not much in general is known about e ciency of linear representations of groups, most of the general problems are wide open. In particular, it would be very interesting to study minimal (and e cient) matrix representation of nilpotent and polycyclic groups, and their holomorphs, and especially nite groups.
. Results and the structure of the paper In Section , we describe some typical cryptosystems based on non-commutative groups (semigroups, algebras) . Most of them are best understood as various generalizations of the classical Di e-Hellman (DH) scheme. In particular, we discuss schemes based on the conjugacy search problem, the decomposition and factorization problems, and actions by automorphisms. It is worth while to mention here that the famous Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld scheme [ ] is not part of our discussion, since, on the one hand, it is not of Di e-Hellman type, and on the other hand, it is currently under another powerful linear algebra attack from [ ].
In Section , we explain the basic ideas of the linear decomposition attacks and provide some useful algorithms. The algorithms work in polynomial time in the size of the public data described in the schemes. All these results are rather theoretical: we did not try to improve neither on the e cacy of the algorithms nor on the complexity bounds, no doubts that both could be tighten up considerably.
In Section , we give cryptanalysis of a variety of group-based protocols of Di e-Hellman type. There are two main results here. The rst one claims that the linear decomposition attacks give a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that recovers the secret shared key from the public data in all the schemes we discuss in the section. The second result shows that in all these schemes the typical computational security assumptions are not very relevant to the security of the schemes, i.e., one can break the schemes without solving the algorithmic problems on which the assumptions are based. This is rather striking since the schemes together with the assumptions were known for some time and studied quite thoroughly.
. E cacy of linear decomposition attacks
As we have mentioned above, some of the DH-like schemes based on group-theoretic problems are susceptible to linear decomposition attacks, provided that the platform groups (or some other related groups) are linear. One of the possible ways to fail the attack is to use non-linear groups as platforms. However, this would leave behind all nite groups, which are known to be linear. Another way is to allow linear groups G as platforms, but only those whose smallest faithful linear representations G → GL n ( ) have "prohibitively high" dimensions n, which makes dimension attacks implausible. Of course, if the platform group G is xed then the dimension of any xed linear representation of G is a constant, so the dimension attack still works in polynomial time (though the constants in the polynomials could be very large). To make the situation more clear one has to consider a class C of platform groups such that the dimension n(G) of a smallest linear representation of G grows exponentially with respect to the size of the given description of G (for example, with respect to the size of the given nite presentation of G in terms of generators and relators). This approach accommodates naturally any in nite class C of nite groups.
Notice that the class of linear groups is very large. Besides nite groups it contains nitely generated nilpotent groups, arbitrary polycyclic groups, right angled Artin and braid groups, holomorphs of polycyclic groups, etc. Not all nitely generated metabelian groups are linear, but all of them admit faithful representations into nite direct products of general linear groups. Surprisingly, not much is known about the dimensions of smallest faithful linear representations of such in nite groups as nilpotent, or polycyclic, even less about metabelian groups. De Graaf and Nickel [ , ] studied the classical linear representations of nitely generated torsion-free nilpotent groups G into UT n (ℤ) from the algorithmic view-point, showing in particular that there are polynomial time (in the Hirsh length of G) algorithms to construct the representations. Recently, Habeeb and Kahrobaei [ ] showed, following [ ], that the dimension of the classical representations above is O(n ) where n is the Hirsh length of the group. It seems the dimension is not prohibitively high in this case. However, there are nilpotent groups with presentations (in generators and relators) whose size is logarithmically smaller than their Hirsh length. Indeed, free nilpotent groups of class c and rank r have presentations with r generators and no relations in the variety of nilpotent groups of class at most c, but their Hirsh length is about r c+ . On the other hand, to use a group G as a platform in cryptography requires a fast solution of the word problem in G, as well as fast algorithms for computing normal forms of group elements (see [ ] for details). It seems the known algorithms for computing normal forms in nilpotent groups rely on so-called polycyclic presentations of nilpotent groups whose size is about the same as the Hirsh length of the group. The situation with nite nilpotent groups is even more interesting. Some upper bounds for dimensions of smallest linear representations of say nite p-groups are known: Janusz [ ] showed that the minimal faithful representation of a nite p-group as a group of matrices over a nite eld of characteristic p is + p (e− ) where e is the exponent of G, so the degree here is quite large (for some groups it is comparable with the order of the group).
The discussion above highlights several interesting open problems in algorithmic group theory, whose solution would shed some light on security of the corresponding cryptosystems.
Cryptoschemes under the dimension attack
Now we describe cryptosystems which to some extent are susceptible to the dimension attack. But rst a few words on terminology. Most of the cryptoschemes (systems, protocols) discussed below were not originally stated within the formal rules of the current cryptographic practice (see, for example, the book [ ] for de nitions of a cryptosystem), usually some of the required algorithms or parameters are not completely described, or security assumptions are missing. In particular, it is hard to break such schemes because the precise description is lacking. However, they make perfect sense as general ideas or "general schemes" from which the concrete protocols should be worked out after some research on sorting out which parameters are strong and which are not. The research itself usually comes as a series of "attacks" on the scheme and the subsequent cryptanalysis. Our main intention in designing the dimension attack is not on breaking but on improving the generic schemes at hands. In what follows we are focusing on the choice of the so-called platform group, one of the main parameters in the group-based cryptosystems, and discuss how security of the scheme depends on the chosen platform. In particular, we shed some light on some known (computational) security assumptions.
Most of the schemes we discuss in this paper can be best seen in the light of the famous Di e-Hellman (DH) key establishment protocol [ ]. The main idea of DH is very simple and can be described as follows. Two users, say Alice and Bob, rst choose the multiplicative group of integers G = ℤ * p modulo a prime number p, as the platform group, and some element g ∈ G (all this data is public). Alice then selects a random integer k ∈ ℕ (her private key) and sends g k to Bob through a public channel. He in turn picks l ∈ ℕ (his private key) and sends g l to Alice through a public channel. Both Alice and Bob can then compute their secret shared keys K = g kl . An adversary, say Eve, monitoring the transmission between Alice and Bob knows the public data G, g, g k , g l and her task is to recover the shared key K (i.e., to break the scheme). The computational security assumption claims that it is a time consuming task to recover the shared key from the public data. Namely, the claim is that for a xed G, any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm succeeds in breaking the scheme with only negligible probability. We refer to [ ] for precise formulations. Observe that if Eve could compute k or l, then she could nd K easily. Thus we arrive at the underlying algorithmic problem: recover Alice's (or Bob's) private key from the public data. In the case of Di e-Hellman, the underlying algorithmic problem is the famous discrete logarithm problem for G, which asks whether or not one can compute (minimal non-negative) k from given g and g k in probabilistic time. For other schemes the underlying algorithmic problems could be di erent. Notice that it is important how the group G and its elements are given: algebraically the same cyclic group of order p (and its elements) could be given as integers between and p − , or as the group of an elliptic curve, or by a nite presentation. The scheme security depends on the presentation. Furthermore, the scheme still makes sense when the group ℤ * p is replaced by an arbitrary nite (or in nite) group G. This gives rise to a general DH scheme. Various platform groups G were suggested and studied, nite or not: the group of non-singular matrices over a nite eld [ , ] , over a group algebra [ ], over a semigroup [ ], etc. Now we discuss some group based cryptoschemes with respect to the algorithmic problems they are based on.
Schemes based on the conjugacy search problem. One of the possible generalizations of the general DH scheme to arbitrary non-commutative group is to use the conjugacy in the place of exponentiation. Recall that the conjugate of an element g by an element x in a group is de ned by g x = xgx − . The map ϕ x : g → g x is an automorphism of G, called conjugation. One of the principal DH-type schemes based on the conjugation (instead of exponentiation) was introduced by Ko, Lee et al. in [ ] . In this case, let G be a platform group and U, W be two nite subsets of G which are commuting element-wise, i.e., uw = wu for any elements u ∈ U, w ∈ W. Denote by A and B the subgroups of G generated by U and W, respectively, and x an element g ∈ G. All this data is assumed to be public. Then Alice picks a private element a ∈ A and publishes g a . Bob picks a private element b ∈ B and publishes g b . After that Alice computes a shared secret K A = (g b ) a = g ab , while Bob computes the same element as K b = (g a ) b = g ba = g ab . In this scheme, the following is the underlying algorithmic problem (like the discrete log for DH scheme):
• The conjugacy search problem (CSP) in a group G: given two elements g, f ∈ G and information that g x = f
for some x ∈ G, nd at least one particular element x like that. The CSP plays a special role in group-based cryptography. Many protocols and cryptosystems based on groups use one or another variation of CSP. For example, the schemes in [ , , , , ] use CSP; [ , ] use the simultaneous CSP (when one has to solve in a group G a system of the type g x = f , . . . , g x k = f k ).
Schemes based on the decomposition and factorization problems. Again, the DH scheme in a group G can be simulated by replacing exponentiation by right and left multiplication. One of the most typical schemes in this area is due to Shpilrain and Ushakov [ ]. In the notation above, the idea of the scheme is as follows. A group G, two element-wise commuting subgroups A and B, and a xed element g ∈ G are given. Then Alice picks private elements a, a ὔ ∈ A and publishes the element aga ὔ . Bob picks private elements b, b ὔ ∈ B and publishes the element bgb ὔ . After that Alice computes a shared secret key K A = abgb ὔ a ὔ , while Bob computes the same element as K B = baga ὔ b ὔ = abgb ὔ a ὔ . In this scheme, the underlying algorithmic problem is the decomposition search problem.
• The decomposition search problem (DSP) in a group G: given two subgroups A, B ⊆ G and two elements g, f ∈ G, nd elements a ∈ A and b ∈ B such that a ⋅ g ⋅ b = f , provided that at least one such pair of elements exists.
There are two variations of DSP, which have been used in group-based cryptography: • The factorization search problem (FSP) in a group G: given an element f ∈ G and two subsets (usually subgroups) A and B of G, nd elements a ∈ A and b ∈ B such that a ⋅ b = f . • The power conjugacy search problem (PCSP) in a group G: given two elements g, f ∈ G and information that (g k ) x = f for some k ∈ ℕ and x ∈ G, nd at least one particular pair (k, x) like that.
The schemes in [ -, -, , ] are based on DSP and FSP. The schemes in [ , ] use PCSP in matrix groups. Schemes using actions by automorphisms. One natural generalization of the DH scheme is to replace exponentiation by arbitrary commuting automorphisms of the group G. When the automorphisms are conjugations, one gets the scheme [ ] described above. More precisely, let G be a group and g ∈ G. By Aut(G) we denote the group of automorphisms of G. For g ∈ G and ϕ ∈ Aut(G) we denote by g ϕ the image of g under ϕ. Suppose that U, W are two nite subsets of Aut(G) commuting element-wise. Denote by A and B the subgroups in Aut(G) generated by U and W, respectively. Now Alice picks a ∈ A and publishes g a . Bob picks b ∈ B and publishes g b . Then Alice computes a secret shared key K A = (g b ) a = g ba , while Bob computes the same element as K B = (g a ) b = g ab = g ba . The underlying algorithmic problem is the search automorphism problem:
• The search automorphism problem in G: given a subgroup A ≤ Aut(G) and two elements g, h ∈ G, nd an automorphism a ∈ A such that g a = h, provided that such an automorphism exists. Schemes from [ , , ] use the search automorphism (or endomorphism) problems in their design.
The principle idea
In this section, we describe the mathematical idea behind the linear decomposition attacks. Our exposition is closely linked to the "prototypical" schemes discussed in Section .
. Finding a basis
Let V be a nite dimensional vector space over a eld with basis B = {v , . . . , v r }. Let End(V) be the semigroup of endomorphisms of V. We assume that elements v ∈ V are given as vectors relative to B, and endomorphisms a ∈ End(V) are given by their matrices relative to B. For an endomorphism a ∈ End(V) and an element v ∈ V we denote by v a the image of v under a. Also, for any subsets W ⊆ V and A ⊆ End(V) we put W A = {w a | w ∈ W, a ∈ A}, and denote by Sp(W) the subspace of V generated by W, and by ⟨A⟩ the submonoid generated by A in End(V).
The discussion below is about the time complexity of some algorithms. To this end we put some assumptions on computations in .
Computational assumption on the elds. We assume that elements of the eld are given in some constructive form and the "size" of the form is de ned. Furthermore, we assume that the basic eld operations in are e cient, in particular they can be performed in polynomial time in the size of the elements. In all the particular protocols considered in this paper the eld satis es all these conditions.
For an element α ∈ we write ‖α‖ for the size of α and put ‖v‖ = max ‖α i ‖ for a vector v = (α , . . . , α r ) ∈ V, and ‖a‖ = max{‖α ij ‖} for a matrix a = (α ij ) ∈ End(V).
Lemma . (Principal lemma).
There is an algorithm that for given nite subsets W ⊆ V and U ⊆ End(V) nds a basis of the subspace Sp(W ⟨U⟩ ) in the form w a , . . . , w a t t , where w i ∈ W and a i is a product of elements from U. Furthermore, the number of eld operations used by the algorithm is polynomial in r = dim V and the cardinalities of W and U.
Proof. Using Gauss elimination, one can e ectively nd a maximal linearly independent subset L of W. Notice that Sp(L ⟨U⟩ ) = Sp(W ⟨U⟩ ). Adding to the set L one by one elements v a , where v ∈ L , a ∈ U and checking every time linear independence of the extended set, one can e ectively construct a maximal linearly independent subset L of the set L ∪ L U which extends the set L . Notice that Sp(L ⟨U⟩ ) = Sp(L ⟨U⟩ ) and the elements in L are of the form w a , where w ∈ W and a ∈ ⟨U⟩. It follows that if L = L then L is a basis of Sp(W ⟨U⟩ ).
If L ̸ = L then we repeat the procedure for L and nd a maximal linearly independent subset L of L ∪ L U extending L . Keep going one constructs a sequence of strictly increasing subspaces L < L < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < L i of V.
Since the dimension r of V is nite, the sequence stabilizes for some i ≤ r. In this case, L i is a basis of Sp(W ⟨U⟩ ) and its elements are in the required form.
To estimate the upper bound of the number of the eld operations used by the algorithm, observe rst that the number of the eld operations in Gauss elimination performed on a matrix of size n × r is O(n r). Hence it requires at most O(n r) steps to construct L from W, where n = |W| is the number of elements in W. Notice that |L j | ≤ r for every j. So to nd L + j + , it su ces to perform Gauss elimination on the matrix corresponding to L j ∪ L U j which has size at most r + r|U|. Thus the upper estimate on this number is O(r |U| ). Since there are at most r iterations of this procedure, one has the total estimate as O(r |U| + r|W| ). Of course, this estimate is very crude.
Corollary . . With our assumptions on the eld the algorithm in Lemma . works in polynomial time in the size of the inputs, i.e., in r = dim V, |W|, |U|, and max{‖w‖, ‖u‖ | w ∈ W, u ∈ U}.
Notice that the algorithm described in Lemma . can be obviously adapted to noetherian modules over commutative rings.
. The basic linear decomposition attack
Let as above V be a nite dimensional vector space over a eld with basis B = {v , . . . , v r } and U and W be two nite subsets of End(V).
Commutativity assumption. We assume that every element of U commutes with every element of W, i.e., for every v ∈ V, u ∈ U, w ∈ W one has v uw = v wu .
Let A and B be the submonoids of End(V) generated by U and W, respectively. Suppose that a ∈ A, b ∈ B and v ∈ V. We assume that the eld , the space V, the sets U, W and the vectors v, v a , v b are public, while the endomorphisms a and b are private. By the size of the public data we mean the total size of the following parameters: r = dim V (given in unary, i.e., as r ), |W|, |U|, max{‖w‖, ‖u‖ | w ∈ W, u ∈ U}, ‖v‖, ‖v a ‖, ‖v b ‖.
Claim . Given U, W, v, v a , v b , one can nd in polynomial time (in the size of the public data) the vector v ab
Proof. Indeed, given U and v by Lemma . (and its corollary) one can nd in polynomial time a basis of Sp(v A ) in the form v a , . . . , v a t , where a i ∈ A given as some particular products of elements from U. Using Gauss elimination, one can decompose v a as a linear combination in the given basis:
This allows one to compute v ab as follows:
which is immediate, since the vector v b and the matrices a i are known.
The conclusion is that one does not need to nd neither a nor b to compute the vector v ab .
. A linear group acting by conjugation
Let G be a nitely generated group that comes equipped with an injective homomorphism ϕ : G → GL n (A), where A is a nite dimensional associative algebra over a eld .
Computational assumption on A. As usual we assume that elements of A are given in some constructive form and the "size" of the form is de ned. Furthermore, we assume that the basic algebra operations in A are e cient, so they can be performed in polynomial time in the size of the elements. In particular, the matrix multiplication in Mat n (A) can be performed in polynomial time. Of course, all the conditions above obviously hold in the case when A is just the eld .
Since the group G is nitely generated and multiplication in GL n (A) is e cient, one can compute in polynomial time the image g ϕ for any element g ∈ G, given as a word in a xed nite set of generators of G. Notice that V = Mat n (A) can be viewed as a nite dimensional vector space over , where matrices from Mat n (A) are tuples of length n over A, i.e., elements from A n . If A has dimension r over then A n can be viewed as a vector space over of dimension rn in which addition naturally comes from the matrix addition in Mat n (A). The group GL n (A) acts on V by left as well as right multiplication. In both cases, the homomorphism ϕ gives a faithful representation ϕ : G → End(V). It follows that any two given elements g, h ∈ G determine an endomorphism E g,h : Mat n (A) → Mat n (A) de ned by E g,h (x) = ϕ(g)xϕ(h). In particular, the conjugation by g ∈ G in Mat n (A) corresponds to the endomorphism E g,g − .
Let U and W be two nite subsets of G satisfying the commutativity assumption as above, i.e., every element of U commutes with every element of W. Let A and B be the submonoids of G generated by U and W,  respectively. Suppose that a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and 
We also assume that the algebra A, the group G, the embedding ϕ : G → GL n (A), the sets U and W, as well as the elements v, v a , v b are public. As above the size of the public data is the total size of the following parameters: r and n (given in unary), the sizes of U and W, and the sizes of all public elements. Notice that, in this case, we may assume that elements of G are given as words in a xed nite generating set. Due to our assumptions on A and G the embedding ϕ is computable in polynomial time in the length of the words representing elements in G, therefore the sizes of elements of G computed as lengths of the words or the norms of the corresponding matrices are within the polynomial bounds of each other. This implies that the time complexity estimates for our algorithms will be similar if we use representations of the elements as words or as the corresponding matrices.
Claim . Given U, W, g, g a , g b , one can nd in polynomial time (in the size of the public data) the element g ab = g ba .
Proof. Indeed, the argument above shows that the embedding ϕ : G → Mat n (A) gives, in fact, an embedding ϕ : G → End(V) in such a way that conjugation by an element g ∈ G gives rise to an endomorphism E g,g − ∈ End(V). Since the embedding ϕ is polynomial time computable, one nds himself in the situation of the basic linear decomposition attack. Now Claim follows immediately from Claim .
There are several possible variations or generalizations of the basic scheme described in this section, which also could be easily reduced to the basic model. We mention some of them below.
. A linear group acting by right/left multiplication
We assume all the notation from Section . . Beyond that assume also that a, a ὔ ∈ A and b, b ὔ ∈ B.
Claim . Given U, W, g, agb, a ὔ gb ὔ , one can nd in polynomial time (in the size of the public data) the element a ὔ agbb ὔ = aa ὔ gb ὔ b.
Proof. Indeed, an argument similar to the one in Section . reduces Claim to the basic model.
Obviously, Claim is just a particular case of Claim . Observe also that Claim holds if one replaces a group G by a semigroup G. The same argument works in this case as well.
. Groups acting by automorphisms
Let G be a nitely generated group and Aut(G) the group of automorphisms of G. Let U and W be two nite subsets of Aut(G) satisfying the commutativity assumption as above: every element u of U commutes with every element w of W in Aut(G), i.e., for any g ∈ G the equality g uw = g wu holds.
Denote by A and B the submonoids (or subgroups) of Aut(G) generated by U and W, respectively. Now one can consider an analog of the situation described in Section . , where the conjugations are replaced by arbitrary automorphisms. Namely, suppose some automorphisms a ∈ A, b ∈ B are chosen. The question arises weather there is a polynomial time algorithm which when given U ⊆ Aut(G), W ⊆ Aut(G), g ∈ G, and the images g a and g b for some elements a ∈ A, b ∈ B computes the element g ab = g ba in G. Even if the group G is linear (and the embedding ϕ : G → GL n (A) is given), there is no obvious reduction to Claims or . Indeed, in this case, arbitrary automorphisms from Aut(G) do not in general induce endomorphisms on the linear space V (in the notation above). However, the reduction would be possible if one can interprete the automorphisms as conjugations in some (perhaps larger) linear group. Now we discuss one group-theoretic construction that can be useful here.
Recall that the holomorph H(G) of a group G is a semidirect product H(G) = G ⋊ Aut(G) of G and Aut(G), where the multiplication on pairs from G × Aut(G) is de ned by (g, a)(h, b) = (gh a , ab) . By construction the groups G and Aut(G) embed into H(G) via injections g → (g, ) and a → ( , a). Notice that every automorphism a ∈ Aut(G) acts on G by a conjugation in H(G), since ( , a)(h, )( , a − ) = (h a , ) . It follows that if the holomorph H(G) is a linear group, in particular if there is an injective homomorphism ϕ : H(G) → GL n (A) for some n and A as above, then this case can be reduced to Claim . In particular, the following result holds.
Claim .
Suppose that H(G) is a linear group. Then in the notation above, given U, W, g, g a , g b , one can nd in polynomial time (in the size of the public data) the element (g a ) b = (g b ) a .
Observe that the holomorph H(G) is linear when the group G is nite or polycyclic-by-nite [ ].
Suppose a platform group G = gp(g , . . . , g r ) is given by its generators and de ning relations. To apply the linear decomposition we need an e ective embedding µ of G into a linear group GL n ( ). Let µ(g) be a secret date that we get applying our approach to µ(G). We have to recover g as the result in the original language. Suppose there is an e ective procedure of rewriting µ(g) as a word w(µ(g ), . . . , µ(g r )) in the images µ(g i ), i = , . . . , r, of generators. Then g = w(g , . . . , g r ) and we succeed. There are several papers giving such algorithms; see [ ] and references there. Let us to quote from [ ]: "A constructive membership test not only answers the question whether or not a given element belongs to a given group but in the case of positive answer, it also provides a straight-line program that constructs the given element from the given generators of the group."
Recall that constructive membership is the problem of expressing an element in terms of the generators of the group.
Let G be a group and S ⊆ G. A straight-line program reaching some element g ∈ G from S is a sequence (w , . . . , w m ), w i ∈ G, such that for each i either w i ∈ S or w i = w − j for some j < i or w i = w j w k for some j, k < i.
Let G ≤ H be groups; let G be given by a generating set S. The constructive membership problem for G in H is, given g ∈ H, to decide whether g ∈ G, and if so nd a straight-line program over S reaching g.
There is a randomized polynomial-time algorithm which uses number theory oracles and, given a matrix group G of odd characteristic p, solves constructive membership in G.
Previously similar results were given by E. M. Luks [ ] for solvable matrix groups only. Luk's algorithms are deterministic. Other algorithms and their analysis build on a large body of prior work and most notably on the papers [ , , ].
Cryptanalysis of protocols . Protocols based on conjugation ( ) Ko, Lee et al. key establishment protocol [ ].
Let G be a group and U, W be two nite subsets of G which are commuting element-wise. Denote by A and B the subgroups of G generated by U and W, respectively. Fix an element g ∈ G. We assume that all the data above is public.
Algorithm. Alice picks a private element a ∈ A and publishes g a . Bob picks a private element b ∈ B and publishes g b .
Key establishment. Alice computes K
Cryptanalysis. If the group G is linear then by Claim there exists an algorithm that, given the public data above, nds the shared key K in polynomial time.
In the original version of this cryptosystem [ ], G was proposed to be the Artin braid group B n on n strings. In , R. Lawrence described a family of so-called Lawrence representations of B n . Around , S. Bigelow [ ] and D. Krammer [ ] independently proved that all braid groups B n are linear. Their work used the Lawrence-Krammer representations ρ n : B n → GL n(n− )/ (ℤ[t ± , s ± ]) that has been proved faithful for every n ∈ ℕ. One can e ectively nd the image ρ n (g) for every element g ∈ B n . Moreover, there exists an e ective procedure to recover a braid g ∈ B n from its image ρ n (g). It was shown by J. H. Cheon and B. Jun in [ ] that it can be done in O( m log d t ) multiplications of entries in ρ n (g). Here m = n(n − )/ and d t is a parameter that can be e ectively computed by ρ n (g); see [ ] for details. Therefore, in this case, there is a polynomial time algorithm to nd the shared key K from the public data. The algorithm presented here is more practical. Constructing a basis is o -line. In every session, we have to nd on-line, by the Gauss elimination process, coordinates of elements in a given basis of the vector space.
Let Alg(CJ) denote Cheon-Jun's algorithm and Alg(LD) the linear decomposition attack. We can compare these two algorithms.
. Alg(CJ) is not deterministic because it looks for invertible solutions of underlying sets of linear equations. Alg(LD) is completely deterministic. . Alg(CJ) works on-line. Alg(LD) works mostly o -line. . Alg(CJ) deals with bigger sets of variables and equations than Alg(LD) does. . Alg(CJ) uses the speci c embedding µ, but Alg(LD) can work with all e ective linear representations.
Thus Alg(LD) can be used on di erent platforms.
( ) Wang et al. key establishment protocol [ ].
Let G be a non-commutative monoid. Fix an element g ∈ G.
Let x be an invertible element of G. It is assumed that G, g, x are public.
Algorithm. Alice picks a private number s ∈ ℕ and publishes g x s . Bob picks a private number t ∈ ℕ and publishes g x t .
Key establishment. Alice computes K
Cryptanalysis. If the monoid G is linear, then by Claim there exists an algorithm that, given the public data above, nds the shared key K in polynomial time.
However Hurley's authentication and digital signature protocols [ , ] . Let G be a commutative subgroup of GL n ( ). These dates are public.
Algorithm.
. Bob picks y ∈ n and B ∈ G, computes and publishes yB. . Alive wants to send a message x ∈ n to Bob. She picks A , A ∈ G, computes and sends (xA, yBA ) to Bob. . Bob picks B , B ∈ G, computes and sends (xAB , yA B ) to Alice. . Alice computes (xB , yB ) and sends xB − yB to Bob. . Bob computes x − yB B − and recovers x.
Bob may use yB in further transactions.
Cryptanalysis. Since the group G is linear, by Claim there exists an algorithm that, given the public data above, nds the message x in polynomial time. Indeed, let us describe the recovering algorithm.
. By Claim we build a basis of the space Sp(yBA )G. Let this basis be {yBA C , . . . , yBA C r }, where C i ∈ G, i = , . . . , r. . Then we obtain yB = ∑ r i= α i yBA C i , α i ∈ . . Swap yBA by yA B . We have ∑ r i= α i yA B C i = yB . . Similarly, we construct a basis xAB D , . . . , xAB D t , D j ∈ G, j = , . . . , t, of Sp(xAB )G. Let G be a non-abelian nite group and let g and f be two noncommuting elements of G. Let k and l be the orders of g and f , respectively. It is assumed that G, g, f, k , l are public.
Hence, (g ξ ) ψ = (∑ t i= α i (g ϕ ) c i ) ψ , so we derive g ξ = t i= α i (g ϕ ) c i .
( ) Habeeb, Kahrobaei, Koupparis and Shpilrain's key exchange protocol [ ].
Let G be a (semi)group, and Aut(G) be the automorphism group of G. Let H(G) be the holomorph of G. Fix an element g ∈ G and an automorphism ϕ ∈ Aut(G). All this data is public. In this paragraph, for g ∈ G and µ ∈ Aut(G) we write the image as µ(g) instead of g µ .
Algorithm. Alice picks a private number m ∈ ℕ. Then she computes (ϕ, g) m = ϕ m , ϕ m− (g) ⋅ . . . ⋅ ϕ (g) ⋅ ϕ(g) ⋅ g and sends only the second component a m = ϕ m− (g) ⋅ . . . ⋅ ϕ (g) ⋅ ϕ(g) ⋅ g of this pair to Bob. Bob picks a private n ∈ ℕ. Then he computes (ϕ, g) n = ϕ n , ϕ n− (g) ⋅ . . . ⋅ ϕ (g) ⋅ ϕ(g) ⋅ g and sends only the second component a n = ϕ n− (g) ⋅ . . . ⋅ ϕ (g) ⋅ ϕ(g) ⋅ g of this pair to Alice.
Key establishment. Alice computes ( * , a n ) ⋅ (ϕ m , a m ) = ( * ⋅ ϕ m , ϕ m (a n ) ⋅ a m ) = ( * ⋅ ϕ m , K A ). Note that she does not actually "compute" * ⋅ ϕ m .
Bob computes ( * * , a m ) ⋅ (ϕ n , a n ) = ( * * ⋅ ϕ n , ϕ n (a m ) ⋅ a n ) = ( * * ⋅ ϕ n , K B ). Note that he does not actually "compute" * * ⋅ ϕ n .
The shared key is K = K A = K B = a m+n .
Cryptanalysis. Let G ≤ A, where A is a nite dimensional associative algebra over a eld . Assume that the automorphism ϕ is extended to an automorphism of the underlying vector space of A.
Using Gauss elimination, we can e ectively nd a maximal linearly independent subset L of the set {a , a , . . . , a k , . . .}, where a = g and a k = ϕ k− (g) ⋅ . . . ⋅ ϕ(g) ⋅ g for k ≥ . Indeed, suppose that the set {a , . . . , a k } is linearly independent, but a k+ can be presented as a linear combination of the form a k+ = k i= λ i a i for λ i ∈ .
Suppose by induction that a k+j can be presented as above for every j ≤ t − . In particular, Thus L = {a , . . . , a k }. In particular, we can e ectively compute a n = k i= η i a i for some η i ∈ .
Then a m+n = ϕ m (a n ) ⋅ a m = Note that all data on the right-hand side is known now. Thus we get the shared key K = a m+n . In the original version of this cryptosystem [ ], G was proposed to be the semigroup of × matrices over the group algebra [ ], where is the alternating group on elements. The authors of [ ] used an extension of the semigroup G by an inner automorphism which is conjugation by a matrix H ∈ GL ( [ ]). Therefore, in this case, there is a polynomial time algorithm to nd the shared key K from the public data.
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